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Abstract
It is commonly thought that in an election with two parties there can be no strate-
gic voting - voters simply vote for their preferred candidate. In this paper, I show that
strategic voting comes to the fore in legislative elections with multiple policy dimen-
sions. In sharp contrast to single-district elections, the intensity of a voter’s preference
on each dimension is irrelevant for her voting decision. Instead, she votes solely based
on the dimension which is most likely to be pivotal in the legislature. Anticipating
this behaviour, candidates put forward a different set of policies than they would in a
single-district election. For large elections I show that the implemented policy bundle:
(a) is uniquely pinned down by voter preferences, (b) is preferred by a majority of dis-
tricts on each dimension, (c) is a Condorcet winner, if one exists. These properties are
not guaranteed in a single-district election. Furthermore, I show that (i) parliamentary
systems generate superior policies to presidential systems and (ii) voter polarisation
affects outcomes in single-district elections but not legislative elections.
Keywords: Strategic Voting, Legislative Elections, Multi-dimensional Policy, Pivotal
Voting, Plurality Rule, Large Elections.
JEL Classification Number: C72, D72, D78.
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1 Introduction
Voters often find themselves between a rock and a hard place. Consider the plight
of an economically-right, socially-liberal voter - a “Rockefeller Republican” - in the US
2016 Presidential Election. Should she vote for economically-left, socially-liberal Clinton
or economically-right, socially-conservative Trump? In the UK 2019 General Election many
traditional working-class voters faced a similar dilemma - do they plump for the economically-
left, socially-liberal Labour party, or the economically-right, socially-conservative Tory
party? At first, the answer seems straightforward: hold your nose and vote for the least
bad of the two. If you’re a Rockefeller Republican who cares more about the economy than
social issues, vote Trump, otherwise vote Clinton. UK traditional working-class voters who
care more about social than economic issues back the Tories, while the others back Labour.
This intuition is correct in a single-district election such as a mayoral election or a pres-
idential election. Whoever wins the election implements policy, so voters are essentially
voting directly over two policy bundles. Given the two options presented, a voter’s best
course of action is simply to vote for the bundle they dislike least. In this paper, I show that
this intuition does not carry over to legislative elections. In a legislative election, voters in
a district elect a representative to the legislature, and it is there that policy is determined.
Their district will only matter for the final policy outcome if it changes the legislative ma-
jority on one of the two dimensions. Here, a voter needs to ask: “when will my district
be pivotal nationally? Is it more likely to swing the legislative majority on the economic
dimension or the social issues dimension?”. It may well be that a voter cares a lot more
about the economic dimension but, because of how other districts behave, it is more likely
that her vote will make a difference on the social issues dimension. How should this voter
behave? I show that as the size of the electorate gets large, voters should focus exclusively
on the dimension where they are more likely to be pivotal, regardless of how much or little
they care about that dimension. In a nutshell, a voter’s preference intensity is irrelevant for
their voting decision.
The critical difference between single-district and legislative elections is in the behaviour
of conflicted voters - those who prefer one candidate on one dimension but the other candi-
date on the other dimension. We might wonder if this actually has any meaningful aggregate
effects. After all, if candidates are strategic and choose policies to maximise their probability
of winning, we might expect their policy platforms to reflect the preferences of the vast bulk
of voters. In other words, if most voters are either liberal on both dimensions or conservative
on both dimensions, why should Rockefeller Republicans have any impact on candidate plat-
forms? On the contrary, I show that the behaviour of conflicted voters has substantial effects
2
on the platforms that candidates choose and on the final implemented policy. First, out-
comes are more predictable. In legislative elections, the platforms of candidates and the final
policy are uniquely pinned down by voter preferences as the size of the electorate gets large.
This is not the case in single-district elections. There, candidates often play non-degenerate
mixed strategies when selecting their platforms, meaning the platforms voters face and the
implemented final policy is random. Second, policy outcomes are more representative. In
single-district elections, party loyalists always vote along party lines, so only a subset of vot-
ers are swing voters. Candidates target these swing voters, and this may lead to platforms
and final policies which do not reflect the preferences of the majority of voters. Instead, in
a legislative election, every type of voter is a swing voter. Candidates can no longer ignore
the preferences of party loyalists as they too may cross party lines. The knock-on effect is
that, in each district, one candidate always chooses a platform which has majority support
on both dimensions. When we aggregate across districts, this means that the implemented
policy is the one preferred by a majority of districts on each dimension. Third, there is a
welfare windfall from the strategic behaviour of conflicted voters: Condorcet winner poli-
cies are guaranteed to be implemented in legislative elections but not so in single-district
elections. After the main analysis, I study applications of the model to two key political de-
bates - which system of government produces better outcomes? And what effect does voter
polarisation have on political outcomes? I show that parliamentary systems typically result
in higher voter welfare than presidential systems. Then, I find that increased polarisation
of voter preferences does not affect outcomes in legislative elections (implemented policies
remain optimal) but can change outcomes (for better or worse) in single-district elections.
The overall message is, in a world with multiple dimensions of policy, legislative elections
outperform single-district elections.
I argue that this distinction between legislative and single-district elections matters for
several reasons. First, the most important elections worldwide for determining policy are leg-
islative elections, e.g. US Congress, UK House of Commons, Canadian House of Commons,
Indian Lok Sabha. Therefore, if there is a difference in optimal voter behaviour between
single-district and legislative elections, it may have large and widespread consequences. Sec-
ond, the difference in behaviour depends on voters having preferences over more than one
dimension of policy. Several studies, polls and newspaper accounts have documented the
evolution of the traditional left-right voter divide into a more complex structure where vot-
ers care about multiple dimensions and these cut across party allegiances.1 Thus, while the
1 See e.g. Buisseret and Van Weelden (2019),https://www.economist.com/britain/2019/01/19/the-
great-rescrambling-of-britains-parties, https://www.voterstudygroup.org/publication/political-divisions-in-
2016-and-beyond.
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difference in voting incentives between single-district and legislative elections may have been
purely theoretical in the past, clearly that is no longer the case. Third, voters of all stripes
want to maximise the impact of their vote, but they may be wasting their vote or even help-
ing an adversary without the correct analysis to base their choices on. A notable example
is in the UK, where several tactical voting groups exists. Some, such as Tactical Vote and
Turf Out The Tories, want to prevent a Conservative majority while others, such as Best
for Britain and Remain United, want to prevent Brexit. Their advice on how to vote often
conflicts as their objectives are not fully aligned, leaving potential strategic voters unsure
how to vote optimally. My analysis shows that there is no conflict between such groups in a
legislative election - voters (and interest groups) should focus only on the dimension where
the legislative majority is most likely to change. Fourth, the distinction between single-
district and legislative elections matters because they result in different policy outcomes for
the same distribution of voter preferences. This is important for constitutional design as
presidential systems typically choose policy via single-district elections, while parliamentary
systems use legislative elections. Fifth, the distinction between single-district and legislative
elections will matter if they respond differently to shocks. I show that this is the case for
shocks to voter preferences, i.e. increased polarisation.
There are two binary dimensions of policy in the model: a left-right dimension and
another dimension which I call reform/anti-reform. We could instead think of that second
dimension being Brexit/anti-Brexit, globalisation/anti-globalisation, or pro-life/pro-choice
etc. Two key features of the model are that (i) both of these dimensions are binary, and
(ii) candidates have a fixed position on the left-right dimension. The model shares these
features with the model of Krasa and Polborn (2010) who examine single-district elections.
By keeping these same assumptions, I can easily compare my results to theirs. In reality,
many issues are binary or at least perceived to be binary by voters, e.g. whether a candidate
is pro- or anti- Brexit, abortion, or gun control. Furthermore, if issues are continuous, it
is well known that equilibria may not exist.2 I assume candidates are fixed on the left-
right dimension as in practice party affiliation is fixed - politicians find it very difficult to
switch from one party to another or from a left-wing to a right-wing position. We could
allow candidates to choose their positions on both dimensions, but then they would both
choose the same position, and each would win with probability 0.5 - something we don’t
see in reality. The model differs from that of Krasa and Polborn (2010) in that I focus on
legislative elections which in turn allows voters to behave strategically.
The paper contributes to the various strands of the political economy literature. First,
to the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to combine legislative elections with
2See Xefteris (2017) for a discussion of these issues.
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multiple dimensions of policy. Most models have either examined legislative elections with
a single dimension of policy (Austen-Smith, 1984; Callander, 2005; Eyster and Kittsteiner,
2007) or multiple dimensions of policy in a single district (Besley and Coate, 2008; Krasa and
Polborn, 2010; Aragone`s, Castanheira, and Giani, 2015; Xefteris, 2017).3 Legislative elections
have garnered increasing attention from researchers of late but these have either focused on
a single dimension with three parties (Hughes, 2016) or where one dimension voters care
about is local and the other is national (Polborn and Snyder, 2017; Krasa and Polborn,
2018). Second, it contributes to the literature on strategic voting. Here, the emphasis has
typically been on multi-candidate elections (Myerson, 2002; Myatt, 2007; Patty, Snyder, and
Ting, 2009; Bouton and Castanheira, 2012)) or where information aggregation has a role to
play (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1997; Krishna and Morgan, 2011). I show that even where
there is full information and voters only face a choice between two candidates, there are still
incentives to vote strategically, as votes can be pivotal in two different ways.4 Third, the
paper speaks to the vast literature on how political institutions affect policy choices (Persson,
2002; Morelli, 2004; Persson and Tabellini, 2005; Bordignon, Nannicini, and Tabellini, 2016).I
show that in majoritarian systems, the type of election affects the congruence between voters
and policies: legislative (parliamentary) elections generate superior policies to single-district
(mayoral or presidential) elections. Finally, an application of the model in Section 5 adds
to the literature on how political polarisation interacts with electoral institutions (Matakos,
Troumpounis, and Xefteris (2016); Gentzkow (2016); Canen, Kendall, and Trebbi (2020)).
The paper proceeds as follows. I introduce the model and define an equilibrium in the
Section 2. In Section 3, I solve the model. Then, in Section 4, I highlight the main results
of the model and compare them to the literature. In Section 5, I use the model to generate
additional results on (i) presidential versus parliamentary systems, and (ii) the impact of
polarisation. Section 6 discusses the assumptions of the model, implications for the real-
world, and concludes.
2 Model
Candidates & Policy-Making A legislature is made up of D seats, one for each district,
where D is an odd number. There is a left and right candidate in each district. Candidates
must choose a platform of either supporting a social reform (Y ) or opposing it (N). That is,
each candidate is constrained to run under the relevant party platform, but free to be pro- or
3See Osborne (1995) for a review of candidate competition in single-district and legislative elections with
one dimension.
4There is a related literature where voters can either be pivotal for the electoral outcome or for the signal
that is sent to politicians about voter preferences (Razin, 2003; Myatt, 2017).
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anti-reform. Candidates choose their platforms to maximise their probability of being elected
in the district. Let µd = (µL, µR) be the probabilities with which each candidate in district d
chooses a pro-reform platform. The strategies of all candidates in all districts are summarised
by µ ≡ (µ1, . . . , µd, . . . , µD). Once candidates choose their platforms, each district faces
one of four platform pairs: ad ∈ {(aLN , aRN), (aLY , aRY ), (aLN , aRY ), (aLY , aRN)}. In each
district, an election is held, and whichever candidate wins a majority of votes is elected
to the legislature. The post-election seat distribution in the legislature is given by S =
(sLN , sLY , sRN , sRY ), where each element denotes the number of seats won by a candidate
with that platform. The final policy z ∈ {zLN , zLY , zRN , zRY } is decided in the legislature
by separate majority votes on each dimension. Each legislator is committed to supporting
the platform he was elected on. 5
Voters A voter does not care who wins her district per se, all that matters is the final policy,
z, decided in the legislature. A voter’s type t ∈ T ≡ {tLN , tNL, tLY , tY L, tRN , tNR, tRY , tY R}
characterises not only her preferred position on each dimension but also their relative im-
portance to her. I explicitly define the preference ordering of two types of voters, where the
remaining six are similarly defined:
U(zLN |tLN) > U(zLY |tLN) > U(zRN |tLN) > U(zRY |tLN) (1)
U(zLN |tNL) > U(zRN |tNL) > U(zLY |tNL) > U(zRY |tNL)
It will often be easier to refer to sets of types tL, tR, tY , tN where tL = {tLN , tNL, tLY , tY L},
tR = {tRN , tNR, tRY , tY R}, tN = {tLN , tNL, tRN , tNR}, tY = {tLY , tY L, tRY , tY R}.
Following Myerson (2000, 2002), the number of voters in each district is not known
but rather is a random variable kd, which follows a Poisson distribution and has mean k.
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Appendix A summarises several properties of the Poisson model.7 The actual population of
voters in d consists of kd independent and identically distributed draws from a distribution
fd. The probability that a randomly drawn voter in district d is of type t is fd(t), with∑
t fd(t) = 1. The draws in d from fd are independent of the draws in any other district d
′
from fd′ . A voter knows her own type, the distribution from which she was drawn, and the
distribution functions of the other districts, f ≡ (f1, . . . , fd, . . . , fD), but she does not know
the actual distribution of voters that is drawn in any district. We say the left candidate is the
5As shown by Kramer (1972), with separable preferences sincere and strategic voting lead to the same
equilibrium, furthermore, the order of voting or allowing for reconsideration will not affect the outcome.
6The probability that there are exactly η voters in a district is Pr[kd = η] =
e−kkη
η! .
7The use of Poisson games in large election models is now commonplace as it simplifies the calculation
of probabilities while still producing the same predictions as models with fixed but large populations. See
e.g. Krishna and Morgan (2011), Bouton and Castanheira (2012), Bouton (2013).
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advantaged candidate if fd(tL) > 0.5 while the right candidate is advantaged if the inequality
is reversed. Candidates know f , but not its realisation. I make the following assumption on
f .
Assumption 1. There is at least one district where either fd(tNR) > fd(tY L) and fd(tNL) >
fd(tY R), or fd(tNR) < fd(tY L) and fd(tNL) < fd(tY R) holds.
This ensures there is a minimal amount a variation in preferences across districts, and is
sufficient to guarantee we cannot have every district be a (aLN , aRY ) contest or every district
be a (aLY , aRN) contest. The details of why this is are Appendix B.
8 If the assumption does
not hold, there may be no heterogeneity within parties, in which case voting behaviour in
legislative elections and single-district elections coincides.
Let V ≡ {vL, vR} be the set of actions a voter can take.
9 A voting strategy is σ : T×D →
∆(V ) where σd(t) is the probability that a type t voter in district d casts ballot vL, with
1− σd(t) being the probability that this type votes vR. In a Poisson game, all voters of the
same type in the same district must follow the same strategy.10 The expected vote share of
the left candidate in the district is
νd =
∑
t∈T
σd(t)fd(t) (2)
which can also be interpreted as the probability of a randomly selected voter playing vL. The
left candidate is the expected winner if νd > 0.5 while the right candidate is if νd < 0.5.
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As k → ∞ the probability that the expected winner wins the district goes to one.12 Let
σ ≡ (σ1, . . . , σd, . . . , σD) denote the profile of voter strategies across districts and ν ≡
(ν1, . . . , νd, . . . , νD) denote the profile of expected vote shares for the left candidates. Thus,
we have ν(σ, f).
Pivotality and Payoffs A district is pivotal if the policy outcome z depends on which
candidate that district elects. When deciding on her strategy, a voter need only consider
cases in which her vote affects the policy outcome. Therefore, she will condition her vote
8The preferences in Assumption 1 are those in Case 1 and 2 of Table 4 respectively.
9Voting is costless; thus, there will be no abstention.
10This stems from the very nature of population uncertainty. See Myerson (1998)) pg. 377 for more
detail.
11If νd = 0.5, a coin toss determines the winner.
12This is because as the number of draws from fd gets large, the probability that a majority of draws are
from minority supporters goes to zero.
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choice on her district being pivotal.13 There are five distinct types of pivotal event:
P ≡ {piv(LR|N), piv(LR|Y ), piv(NY |L), piv(NY |R), piv(LR,NY )}
where piv(LR|N) is when the district is pivotal between zLN and zRN , piv(NY |L) is when
the district is pivotal between zLN and zLY , and so on. Where convenient I will simply
refer to piv(LR|N) and piv(LR|Y ) as piv(LR) events and to piv(NY |L) and piv(NY |R) as
piv(NY ) events.
The event piv(LR,NY ) is when the district is pivotal on both dimensions of policy. In
this case, depending on the platforms in the district, all four policy outcomes are possible.
Assumption 2. When deciding how to cast their ballot, voters ignore the event of being
jointly pivotal on both dimensions of policy, piv(LR,NY ).
This assumption comes with some loss of generality, which I argue is minimal. For a
legislature of size D there are only D+1
2
possible seat distributions which would make a
given district pivotal on both dimensions while there
∑D−1
2
d=1 4d single-pivotal events. The
larger a legislature, the smaller the share of events that are pivotal on both dimensions. For
example, in the 435-seat US House there are 218 double-pivotal events but 94,612 single-
pivotal events, in the 650-seat UK House of Commons there are 325 double-pivotal events
but 210,600 single-pivotal events. While the share of double-pivotal events vis a vis single-
pivotal events is small, we might worry that, nonetheless, many districts condition on a
double-pivotal event. As I show in Appendix C, the restrictions needed for a district to
be conditioning on a double-pivotal event are very stringent and unlikely to be generally
applicable. Furthermore, Assumption 2 is not required for Lemma 1, Proposition 1, or its
first corollary.
We can now turn to voter payoffs. Let Gt,d(vL|kν, a) denote the expected gain for a voter
type t in district d of voting for the left candidate rather than the right candidate, given the
vector of platforms a and expected vote shares ν. The expected gain of voting vL when she
is in a (aLN , aRN) or (aLY , aRY ) district is given by
Gt,d(vL|(aLN , aRN), kν, a−d) = (3)
Gt,d(vL|(aLY , aRY ), kν, a−d) = Pr[pivd(LR|N)](U(zLN |t)− U(zRN |t))
+ Pr[pivd(LR|Y )](U(zLY |t)− U(zRY |t))
13We could additionally have voters condition on their vote being pivotal within their district, but this
would not alter any of the results.
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Here, the only way a vote can be pivotal is by switching the legislative majority from L
to R. The set of pivotal events in a (aLY , aRN) district also includes those cases where the
reform is passed if the left candidate wins but not if the right candidate wins.
Gt,d(vL|(aLY , aRN), kν, a−d) = Pr[pivd(LR|N)](U(zLN |t)− U(zRN |t)) (4)
+Pr[pivd(LR|Y )](U(zLY |t)− U(zRY |t))
+Pr[pivd(NY |L)](U(zLY |t)− U(zLN |t))
+Pr[pivd(NY |R)](U(zRY |t)− U(zRN |t))
Similarly, the set of pivotal events in a (aLN , aRY ) district includes those cases where the
reform is not passed if the left candidate wins but is if the right candidate wins.
Gt,d(vL|(aLN , aRY ), kν, a−d) = Pr[pivd(LR|N)](U(zLN |t)− U(zRN |t)) (5)
+Pr[pivd(LR|Y )](U(zLY |t)− U(zRY |t))
+Pr[pivd(NY |L)](U(zLN |t)− U(zLY |t))
+Pr[pivd(NY |R)](U(zRN |t)− U(zRY |t))
A voter’s best response is to vote vL if the gain function is positive, vR if negative. We
say a voter is conflicted is she has both positive and negative terms in her gain function,
and unconflicted if all the terms in her gain function have the same sign. All voter types
in (aLN , aRN) and (aLY , aRY ) districts are unconflicted voters. Types tLN , tNL, tRY , tY R in
(aLY , aRN) districts and types tLY , tY L, tRN , tNR in (aLN , aRY ) districts are conflicted voters.
Timing The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Nature draws a population of kd voters from each fd
2. Candidates simultaneously choose their platforms, giving ad in each district.
3. In each district voters elect a single legislator by plurality rule, giving a seat distribution
S.
4. Final policy z is chosen in the legislature by two separate majority votes.
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Equilibrium Concept The mapping from seat shares into policy is mechanical, so will
be omitted from the definition of equilibrium. Equilibrium in this game consists of a voting
equilibrium in stage 3, σ∗, and a candidate equilibrium in stage 2, µ∗. In a voting equi-
librium, each voter type in each district best responds to the strategies of all other voters
in all districts. In a candidate equilibrium, candidates best respond to the strategy of their
local opponent and the strategies of voters in their district. I restrict attention to responsive
candidate equilibria. A candidate equilibrium µ∗ is non-responsive if it can be sustained for
any distribution of voter preferences f . 14 As we are interested in the properties of large na-
tional elections, I will analyse asymptotic equilibria. That is, the limit of the set of equilibria
as k → ∞. More specifically, following Bouton and Gratton (2015), I restrict attention to
asymptotic strictly perfect equilibria. A sequence of Nash equilibria {µ∗k,σ
∗
k}k→∞ is asymp-
totically strictly perfect if (i) it admits a limit and (ii) as k grows large, the equilibrium is
robust to epsilon changes in the strategies of players. This restriction is to rule out knife-edge
cases where the equilibrium depends on multiple events having the same probability of being
pivotal.
3 Equilibrium
Policymaking in the Legislature Given the legislative voting rule, there is a direct
mapping from seat shares to policy outcomes: if sLN + sLY > sRN + sRY and sLN + sRN >
sLY +sRY , the final policy is zLN while if sLN+sLY > sRN+sRY and sLN+sRN < sLY +sRY ,
the final policy is zLY . Reversing the first inequality in each case gives us policies of zRN
and zRY respectively.
Voting A voter’s decision will depend on the platform pair in her district but may, in
principle, also depend on platforms and voter strategies in the other D − 1 districts. The
following lemma shows this is the case for conflicted voters.
Lemma 1. Conflicted voters are strategic voters - their best response depends on the strate-
gies of voters and candidates in the other D−1 districts. Unconflicted voters have a dominant
strategy for any given a.
Proof. See Appendix D.
14There are many non-responsive equilibria in a game such as this. For example, any equilibrium where
D+3
2 districts have platforms (aLN , aRN ) is non-responsive. As no district can ever be pivotal on the social
reform dimension, any strategy for a candidate is a best response. The same is true for any equilibrium
where D+32 districts have platforms (aLY , aRY ).
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A conflicted voter has positive and negative terms in her gain function, so her best
response depends on the relative size of these terms. Whether the function is positive or
negative will depend on (i) the utility difference between each pair of policies and on (ii)
the probability of her district being pivotal between each pair of policies. A voter’s type
determines the former while the latter depends on the strategies of voters and candidates in
the other D−1 districts. Therefore, conflicted voters are strategic voters - their best response
depends on the strategies of other players. An unconflicted voter, instead, can ignore (ii)
because each term in her gain function has the same sign.
We have established that a conflicted voter will either vote vL or vR depending on the
various elements of her gain function. I now show that as the number of voters gets large
and the probability of each pivotal event goes to zero, she need only consider the most likely
pivotal event. Let pivid denote the i-th most likely pivotal event for district d. A property of
the Poisson model is that conditional on being pivotal, the most likely pivotal event piv1d is
infinitely more likely to occur than any other pivotal event. This greatly simplifies the best
response of a conflicted voter.
Proposition 1. As k →∞ the best response for a voter is to vote solely based on the most
likely pivotal event, piv1d. These best responses are represented in Table 1.
Proof. See Appendix D.
District Vote vL Vote vR
(aLN , aRN)
tNL, tLN , tY L, tLY tNR, tRN , tY R, tRY
(aLY , aRY )
(aLN , aRY ) with piv
1
d(LR)
(aLY , aRN) with piv
1
d(LR)
(aLN , aRY ) with piv
1
d(NY ) tNL, tLN , tNR, tRN tY L, tLY , tY R, tRY
(aLY , aRN) with piv
1
d(NY ) tY L, tLY , tY R, tRY tNL, tLN , tNR, tRN
Table 1: Best responses of each voter type
The proposition follows from a straightforward application of Lemma 1 in Hughes (2016),
reproduced in Appendix A. If the expected seat share is such that their district is pivotal
in expectation, voters vote based on that pivotal event. If their district is not pivotal
in expectation, then, in theory, voters need to calculate the probability of all the various
pivotal events. These various pivot probabilities go to zero as the number of voters goes to
infinity, but those with smaller probability go to zero at a faster rate. Therefore, conditional
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on being pivotal, the probability of being in the pivotal event with the largest probability
goes to one as the size of the electorate grows. Because of this, voters can safely ignore all
but the most likely pivotal event when making their voting decision. While the proposition
applies to all voter types, its power is in pinning down the best response of conflicted voters.
A number of additional results follow directly from Proposition 1. The following corollary
shows that every voter type is a potential swing voter.
Corollary 1 to Proposition 1. Depending on the realisation of platforms, a, and the
strategies of other voters, σ, each voter type may either vote vL or vR.
This result can be seen by looking at Table 1. The final two rows show that voting vL
is a best response for each voter type in one case but not in the other. If a district faces
(aLN , aRY ) and the largest pivotal event is piv
1
d(NY ), then all tY types vote vR while all
tN types vote vL. If, instead, a district faces (aLY , aRN) and piv
1
d(NY ), then all tY types
vote vL while all tN types vote vR. The reason is that if the left-right dimension is not the
relevant one, voters choose their preferred candidate on the other dimension - regardless of
that candidate’s position on the left-right dimension.
Corollary 2 to Proposition 1. Voter preference intensity is irrelevant - types tij and tji
always vote the same way.
This result can be seen directly in Table 1. Preference intensity is irrelevant because
as k → ∞ voters only consider one dimension when voting - the dimension most likely to
change the legislative majority. With only one dimension to focus on, the interested of tij
and tji types are aligned.
We might worry that by ignoring all but one dimension of policy, voters may select
suboptimal policies, or that candidates may have incentives to choose winning policies on
one dimension but arbitrary ones on other dimensions. We will see that this is not the case
in equilibrium. In fact, it is precisely by focusing on a single dimension that voters can
guarantee Condorcet winning policies.
Candidate Platform Choice Candidates combine information on voter best responses
from Table 1 with the distribution of voter types, f , to work out the expected vote share
in their district for any of the six possible scenarios. These expected vote shares pin down
the probability of each candidate winning the district. When choosing µ, candidates do not
know whether voters will either condition on piv(LR) or piv(NY ).15 If voters condition on
15By restricting attention to responsive equilibria, we ensure that both pivotal events have positive prob-
ability.
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piv(LR), the positions of candidates on the reform dimension is irrelevant for voters - any
choice of µ is a best response. If voters condition on piv(NY ), the expected probability of
winning for the left candidate is given by
Pr[Lwin|piv1(NY ), µL, µR] = (µLµR + (1− µL)(1− µR))Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)]
+ µL(1− µR)Pr[Lwin|(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )] (6)
+ (1− µL)(µR)(1− Pr[Lwin|(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )])
As only this case matters, the left candidate will choose µL to maximise this expression, while
the right candidate will choose µR to minimise it. The following proposition characterises
all of the equilibria in this candidate competition stage.
Proposition 2. For any given fd, the candidate equilibrium is unique. Both candidates
choose anti-reform policies if fd(tN) > fd(tL), 1 − fd(tL) but pro-reform policies if fd(tN) <
fd(tL), 1 − fd(tL). For all other preference distributions, equilibria (µ
∗
L, µ
∗
R) are in mixed
strategies. As k →∞ in every mixed strategy equilibrium the advantaged candidate chooses
the majority-preferred reform position with probability→ 1 while the disadvantaged candidate
chooses the other reform position with probability → 1. These equilibria are represented in
Table 2.
Proof. See Appendix D.
District Preferences µL µR a
∗
d
fd(tN) > fd(tL), 1− fd(tL) 0 0 (aLN , aRN)
fd(tL), 1− fd(tL) > fd(tN) 1 1 (aLY , aRY )
fd(tL) > fd(tN) > 0.5 or 0.5 > fd(tN) > fd(tL) µ
∗
L → 0 µ
∗
R → 1 → (aLN , aRY )
fd(tL) > 1− fd(tN) > 0.5 or 0.5 > 1− fd(tN) > fd(tL) µ
∗
L → 1 µ
∗
R → 0 → (aLY , aRN)
Table 2: Equilibrium platforms in the candidate competition game. The final two rows are
mixed strategy equilibria that converge to degenerate probabilities as k →∞.
Table 2 shows that the candidate equilibrium is completely pinned down by voter pref-
erences and falls into one of four cases. If the anti-reform majority is larger than the left or
right majority, both candidates run on an anti-reform platform. Similarly, if the pro-reform
majority is larger than either of the ideological majorities, both candidates choose pro-reform
platforms. In each case, as both candidates choose the same reform platform, voters base
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their decisions on the left-right dimension. If one candidate were to deviate to the minority
position on the reform dimension, their expected vote share would decrease.
In all other cases - where the left-right majority is larger than the social reform majority -
the equilibrium is always in mixed strategies. The game here is similar to a matching pennies
game. The advantaged candidate wants to match the policy of the disadvantaged candidate
so that the left-right dimension is the one voters consider. The disadvantaged candidate
wants to avoid choosing the same policy - he would ideally choose the majority policy on
the social reform dimension while the advantaged candidate chooses the minority position.
Clearly, these pure strategies cannot be an equilibrium, as the advantaged candidate would
always seek to match the policy of the disadvantaged candidate.
Given that the equilibria are in mixed strategies, we might be concerned that many
different realisations of platforms may occur for a given f . If this were the case, it would
hinder our understanding of how voter preferences map into platform choices. It turns out,
however, that as the number of voters increases to infinity, the mixed strategy equilibria
converge to pure strategy equilibria in which the advantaged candidate chooses the majority
reform position and the disadvantaged candidate selects the minority reform position. Why
does this happen? If the advantaged candidate chooses the majority reform position, his
expected vote share is greater than a half for any strategy of his opponent. If he selects the
minority position, he will only have a higher vote share if the opponent also chooses the same
policy. The second option may give a higher overall probability of winning, but with a small
risk of losing. In contrast, the safer first option has a tiny risk of losing. As the number
of voters increases, the trade-off goes in favour of the less risky strategy. But why does the
disadvantaged candidate choose the minority-preferred policy with probability going to one?
He does so because if he chose the same platform as the advantaged candidate, voters would
vote based on the left-right dimension, and he would lose with even higher probability.
The uniqueness of equilibrium was not obvious ex-ante. There could, potentially, have
been multiple equilibria for the same preference distributions, e.g. where the candidates
adopt a certain strategy when voters condition on one dimension but a different strategy
when voter focus on another dimension. The fact that candidate strategies are completely
determined by local voter preferences means that candidates can ignore the preferences and
strategies of voters in other districts. This dramatically reduces the complexity of finding
equilibria of the larger game.
District Winners & Policy Outcomes Because the mixed strategies that candidates use
converge to pure strategies as k →∞, the realised vector of district platforms, a, is pinned
down by voter preferences. This does not mean that the voting equilibrium is unique, but,
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as I will now show, it does tell us that in any equilibrium both the expected winner in
each district and the expected implemented policy are unique. The following result follows
directly from Proposition 2.
Proposition 3. As k → ∞ the advantaged candidate in a district is the expected winner
with probability → 1.
Proof. See Appendix D.
In other words, the probability of the dis-advantaged candidate winning the district goes
to zero in large elections. A necessary condition for the dis-advantaged candidate to win in a
large election that candidates are playing the matching pennies game and the dis-advantaged
candidate happens to choose the majority-preferred reform position while the advantaged
candidate happens to choose the minority-preferred position. From Proposition 2, we know
that this occurs with probability going to zero as k →∞. Therefore, with probability going
to one, the winner in district d will be the advantaged candidate with a platform which is
majority-preferred on both dimensions.
I now build on this result to show that the policy implemented in the legislature is
unique, and this policy is preferred by a majority of voters in a majority of districts to the
alternative on each dimension. A small detour is first required to do this. In the standard
one-dimensional Downsian model, the median voter plays a key role - candidates propose
policies to attract the median voter and by doing so, maximise overall voter welfare. In a
multi-dimensional setting such as ours, there is no single median voter. Instead, it is useful
to think of dimension-by-dimension median voters. Let t˜LRd ∈ {tL, tR} denote the expected
median voter in district d on the left-right dimension. This voter prefers left to right if
fd(tL) > 0.5. Similarly, let t˜
NY
d ∈ {tN , tY } denote the expected median voter in district d on
the reform dimension. This voter is anti-reform if fd(tN) > 0.5. We can order the median
voters across districts so that t˜LRd with lower d prefer left to right, and t˜
NY
d with lower d
oppose the reform. Then, t˜LRD+1
2
is the expected median voter in the median district on the
left-right dimension. Similarly, t˜NYD+1
2
is the expected median voter in the median district on
the reform dimension. Note, the median district on one dimension need not be the median
district on the other dimension.
Proposition 4. As k → ∞ the unique expected policy E(z) is that which is preferred by
t˜LRD+1
2
on the left-right dimension and by t˜NYD+1
2
on the reform dimension.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The focus on expected policies and voters above is because of the random nature of the
model. It is always possible for the realised population of voters to differ from the expected
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population sufficiently that E(z) 6= z. However, as k → ∞, this probability goes to zero.
The logic of the proposition is quite straightforward: We know that the expected winner in
each district runs on a policy which is majority-preferred on both dimensions, and wins the
seat with probability→ 1 as k →∞. We also know that the implemented policy, z, requires
a majority of seats on each dimension. Combining these two gives us the result. The
proposition confirms that the disciplining effect of strategic voters on candidates extends
beyond local outcomes. As the number of voters gets large, we are guaranteed a unique
expected policy. Moreover, a majority of voters in a majority of districts prefer this unique
policy to the alternative on each dimension. In other words, the result is as if districts held
separate elections on each dimension of policy.
We can go further in exploring voter welfare in our setting, but, we must again define some
additional terms. A Condorcet winner is a policy that would win a pairwise majority vote
in a district against any other policy. This definition is not useful in a legislative setting as
voters care about national policy outcomes, not local ones. The following definition extends
the pairwise comparison element of a Condorcet winner to a legislative setting.
Definition. A Legislative Condorcet winner is a policy z such that if it faced any other
policy z′ in every district, z would win a majority of seats.
Though the notions of district Condorcet winner and Legislative Condorcet winner are
related, it is worth pointing out how they differ. In a given district, zLN is a Condorcet winner
if fd(tL) > 0.5, fd(tN) > 0.5, and fd(tˆLY ) > 0.5 all hold, where tˆLY ≡ tLY ∪tLN∪tNL∪tNR. A
Legislative Condorcet winner requires the three conditions to hold in a majority of districts,
though not necessarily simultaneously. That is, to be a Legislative Condorcet winner zLN
does not need to be a Condorcet winner in a majority of districts. We can now state the
following result:
Proposition 5. If a Condorcet Winner policy exists in a district, it is the expected winner.
If a Legislative Condorcet winner exists, it is the expected implemented policy E(z).
Proof. See Appendix D.
The first part of the proposition states that if a Condorcet winner policy exists in a
district, it will be chosen. This may seem like the bare minimum one would require from an
electoral rule, but - as I show in the next section - it is generally not easy to guarantee. The
second part of the proposition states that if a Legislative Condorcet winner policy exists, it
will be implemented. This result follows the same logic as Proposition 4: the implemented
policy must be preferred by a majority of voters in a majority of districts to the alternative
on each dimension. By definition, a Legislative Condorcet winner policy is preferred by a
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majority of voters in a majority of districts. Therefore, if such a policy exists, it is sure to
be implemented.
4 Analysis of Main Results
In this section, I highlight how the main results in Section 3 differ from those in the
literature. I focus on three areas where the model’s results are markedly different from those
in other settings.
Strategic Voting The model disproves the conventional wisdom that strategic and sincere
voting coincide when there are only two candidates.16 Indeed, in single-district elections
with multiple dimensions of policy, voting cannot be strategic(Krasa and Polborn, 2010;
Besley and Coate, 2008). Moreover, voting is also non-strategic in legislative elections with
two parties and one dimension of policy. One might reasonably conjecture that this would
remain true when combining legislative elections and multiple dimensions of policy. Instead,
Lemma 1 shows this is not the case: simply voting for whichever of the two candidates’
platforms they prefer is not a best response for conflicted voters.
Strategic voting in our setup has several features which distinguish it from strategic vot-
ing in multi-candidate elections (Myerson and Weber, 1993; Patty, Snyder, and Ting, 2009;
Bouton and Castanheira, 2012; Fisher and Myatt, 2017) and in information aggregation set-
tings (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1997; Bhattacharya, 2013; McMurray, 2013). First, the
probability of a voter’s own ballot being pivotal is irrelevant in our setting. In addition, the
strategies of other voters in her district do not matter at all for how she votes. Instead,
what matters is the relative probability that her district is pivotal in the changing legislative
majority on one dimension rather than the other. Proposition 1 shows this is not overly
complex to calculate. She must simply focus on the most likely case in which her district is
pivotal and base her decision on that dimension of policy alone. In that sense, the informa-
tion she needs to vote strategically is relatively low and much less than in other models of
strategic voting. For example, in multi-candidate elections, a strategic voter needs to know
the strategies and distribution of voters in her district. Her vote choice will depend on which
equilibrium is being played, i.e. who the two frontrunners are. In information aggregation
settings, a voter needs to make inferences about the likely state of the world conditional on
her vote being pivotal. The cognitive burden of these types of strategic voting seems much
16There is a literature on strategic voting with two candidates (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1997) when
voters have incomplete information over their own preferences. Here, voters are fully informed of their
preferences over policies yet still vote strategically.
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larger than in our legislative setting.
In multi-candidate models, there is a unique equilibrium with naive voting but multiple
equilibria under strategic voting. Which equilibrium is played depends purely on voter
beliefs. As such, there is no guarantee that strategic voting generates “good” equilibria.
On the contrary, anything goes!17 In our setting, we get the reverse: strategic voting leads
to a unique policy outcome, while this is not guaranteed with naive voters. Moreover, this
unique policy is the most representative policy possible. Strategic voting in our setting is not
just individually rational - it is welfare maximising. A popular argument against strategic
voting is that election outcomes will not accurately reflect aggregate voter preferences18. My
analysis shows not only that this is false, but that the opposite is true - naive voting does
not accurately reflect voter preferences.
District Behaviour in Legislative v Single-District Elections In Appendix B, I solve
the single district version of the model, originally due to Krasa and Polborn (2010). Fixing
the distribution of preferences in a district, fd, I now compare a single-district election to
the case where the district votes in a legislative election. Several differences, immediately
stand out. First, voting is strategic in legislative elections but deterministic in single-district
elections. Second, all voters are potential swing voters in a legislative election. This is
in sharp contrast with the case of a single-district election studied by Krasa and Polborn
(2010). There, a type that cares more about the left-right dimension always votes for the
same candidate, while only a type who cares more about the reform dimension may switch
allegiance. The reason for the difference is that voters can never be pivotal on the reform
policy alone in a single-district election. Third, from Equation 15 we know that preference
intensity is irrelevant - types tij and tji always vote the same way. They do not need to
weigh up their relative preference across multiple dimensions. Once again, this result is in
sharp contrast with the analysis of single-district elections. There, conflicted types tij and
tji never vote the same way - each votes for their preferred candidate on the dimension they
care more intensely about.
The difference in voter behaviour between single-district and legislative elections also
generates differences in candidate behaviour. Comparing Table 2 to Table 4, we see that
there are many more types of equilibria in the single-district case. Furthermore, the condi-
tions on voter preferences which pin down each equilibrium differ between the two types of
17See Bol and Verthe´ (2019) for an overview of strategic versus sincere voting, and Eggers and Vivyan
(2020) for an analysis of how strategic voting varies by demographic characteristics.
18See for example: https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/what-is-tactical-voting-and-why-is-it-bad-
for-democracy/ and https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/06/wrong-vote-tactically-
general-election.
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election. This means that a district with the same fd can face one platform pair in a single-
district election and another pair in a legislative election. In a legislative election, candidate
behaviour in the district is completely pinned down by voter preferences, but this is not the
case in a single-district - in some equilibria candidates play non-degenerate mixed strategies.
As a result, platforms should exhibit more variance in single-district elections (keeping fd
fixed) than the same district would in a legislative election. Moreover, this non-degenerate
mixing in single-district elections means the probability of the advantaged candidate winning
does not converge to one as the size of the electorate grows. In a single-district election we
can have that (i) the disadvantaged candidate wins with positive probability;(ii) the winning
platform that is not majority-preferred on each dimension; and (iii) a Condorcet winner
policy is not chosen by either candidate.19 None of these hold true for the same district in
a legislative election.
Policy Outcomes in Legislative v Single-District Elections In terms of policy, the
key differences between these two types of elections are that policies are, first, more pre-
dictable and, second, more representative in legislative elections. In terms of predictability,
we know from Proposition 4, that as the number of voters gets large, we are guaranteed
a unique (expected) policy. This is not the case in a single-district election. There, even
as k → ∞ candidates use non-degenerate mixed strategies. This means that candidate’s
chosen platforms and final policies are random. There is not a direct mapping from all voter
preferences into policy outcomes, while there always is for legislative elections.
In terms of representativeness, Proposition 4 says that the final policy in a legislative
election is preferred by the median voter in the median district on each dimension. Further-
more, Proposition 5 says that is a Legislative Condorcet winner exists, it will be implemented.
These results stand in stark contrast to the single-district case. There, the final policy may
not be the one preferred by the median voter on each dimension. In addition, there is no
guarantee that a Condorcet winner policy will be implemented. Why such a difference? In
single-district elections, voters must choose between bundles of policies. As a result, pref-
erence intensity does matter - tLN and tLY types always vote vL while tRN and tRY types
always vote vR. Only types tNL,tY L,tNR,tY R are the swing voters. This gives enormous
influence to these swing voters and pulls policies away from those preferred by the median
voter on each dimension. This undue influence of minority voters with intense preferences
on the secondary dimension is documented in Krasa and Polborn (2010) and Besley and
19This last failure occurs in two different scenarios. In the first scenario, both candidates choose a non-
Condorcet winner policy as it is more attractive to swing voters than the Condorcet winner policy. In the
second scenario, both candidates mix with probability 0.5, so if a Condorcet winner policy exists, it will only
be on the ballot 50% of the time.
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Coate (2008) and finds empirical support in Bouton, Conconi, Zanardi, and Pino (2020).
Besley and Coate (2008) show that citizens initiative can potentially unbundle policies and
bring about outcomes aligned with majority preferences. Proposition 4 shows that such
initiatives are unnecessary in a legislative election as voters can unbundle policies via their
voting behaviour.
5 Applications
5.1 Parliamentary v Presidential Systems
One of the key choices any new democracy faces is whether to become a presidential
or parliamentary system. A vast literature in economics and political science has studied
the effect of having either system on size and composition of government spending, growth,
responses to crises, tax rates, corruption, and electoral campaign spending.20 In these models
the differences between the two systems stem from the executive being subject to a confidence
vote in a parliamentary system but not in a presidential system. Here, I focus on another
less-studied difference between the two systems - the executive is chosen by different types of
elections in each case. A president is typically selected by a direct national election while a
prime minister is chosen by a majority within the legislature.21 In other words, a president is
elected in a single-district election while a prime minister is elected by a legislative election.
We have already seen that the incentives of voters are different under these two types of
elections and that this results in different candidate platforms and implemented policies.
But which system is best for voters?
If there was only one dimension of policy, we could compare under which system the
national median voter, t˜med, fares better. However, with multiple dimensions of policy there
is no single median voter. The natural equivalent is to examine whether the median voter
on each dimension, t˜LRmed ∈ {tL, tR} and t˜
NY
med ∈ {tN , tY }, fares better under a presidential
or parliamentary system. A further complication in comparing welfare between these two
systems is that the respective national median voters t˜LRmed ∈ {tL, tR} and t˜
NY
med ∈ {tN , tY } need
not coincide with the median voters in the median district on each dimension t˜LRD+1
2
∈ {tL, tR}
and t˜NYD+1
2
∈ {tN , tY }.
22 Whether they coincide or not will depend on how voters are
distributed across districts. For example, in a US context it could be that the national
20For an overview see Persson and Tabellini (2005).
21A notable exception to this is the US Presidential election and its Electoral College system.
22t˜LRmed ∈ {tL, tR} and t˜
NY
med ∈ {tN , tY } are respectively at the 50th percentile of the national voter
population on that dimension, but t˜LRD+1
2
∈ {tL, tR} and t˜
NY
D+1
2
∈ {tN , tY } can be anywhere between the 25th
and 75th percentile.
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median voter on the left-right dimension is a Democrat but the the median voter in the
median district (Illinois’s 13th District) is a Republican.23 Similarly, the national median on
the social issues dimension may be pro-choice but the median in the median district on that
dimension may be pro-life. Cases such as this occur if the distribution of voter preferences
across districts is highly asymmetric. In many cases, however, the identities of the national
median and the median voter in the median district will coincide. If this is so, the next
proposition says that voters are better off under a parliamentary system than a presidential
one.
Proposition 6. For any distribution of voter preferences and any distribution of voters
across districts such that t˜
j
med = t˜
j
D+1
2
∀j ∈ {LR,NY }, the utility of t˜jmed is weakly greater
under a parliamentary system than a presidential system.
Proof. See Appendix D.
From Proposition 4, we know that the expected policy in a legislative election is that pre-
ferred by the median voter in the median district on each dimension. If these types coincide
with national median voters, then a parliamentary election always implements the policies
favoured by the national medians on each dimension. Instead, presidential systems suffer
from the problems of single-district elections laid out in Appendix B - candidates choose
policies to attract swing voters, resulting in final policies which may not be the preferred
choice of the median voter on each dimension. The result is somewhat counter-intuitive:
presidential systems have a direct election to choose their leader yet it is parliamentary sys-
tems with their indirect election of a leader that is more representative of voters preferences.
This difference occurs because there is more than one dimension of policy. In a single-district
(presidential) election, voters must choose between two bundles of policies - it is this bundling
of issues that can lead to suboptimal policies. In a legislative (parliamentary) election voters
can act strategically to unbundle the issues and vote on a dimension by dimension basis. It
is this strategic play of voters that brings about better polices under parliamentary systems.
5.2 Polarisation
There has been much debate about causes and consequences of political polarisation
in the US and around the world.24 In this section, I ask whether increased polarisation
can affect candidate platforms and implemented policies; and whether the impact differs
23Illinois’s 13th District is the median district on the left-right dimension according to Cook’s Partisan
Voting Index.
24See Barber and McCarty (2015) for a review of the literature. Gentzkow (2016) argues that it is unclear
whether polarisation has in-fact increased in recent times.
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between single-district and legislative elections. I define an increase in polarisation as an
increase in the share of voters who care primarily about the left-right dimension keeping the
overall share of voters who prefer policy ij fixed. For example, while the share of voters who
support a left, pro-reform policy remains the same - within that group, there is an increase
in tLY voters and a corresponding decrease in tY L voters. No voter changes which policies
they prefer but some voters become more partisan. More formally:
Definition. Let f 1d and f
2
d be two distributions of voters in district d such that f
1
d (tij) +
f 1d (tji) = f
2
d (tij) + f
2
d (tji)∀i ∈ {L,R}, j ∈ {N, Y }. Moving from f
1
d to f
2
d increases polari-
sation if f 2d (tij) ≥ f
1
d (tij) ∀i ∈ {L,R}, j ∈ {N, Y } with the inequality strict for at least one
tij.
Notice that because polarisation simply shifts voters preference intensity, any increase
in polarisation will leave the respective median voters t˜jmed, t˜
j
D+1
2
, j ∈ {LR,NY } unchanged.
As such, polarisation does not alter the optimal policy but as the next proposition shows it
may change the implemented policy.
Proposition 7. In a legislative election, polarisation will have no effect on voter behavior,
candidate platforms or implemented policies. In a single-district election, for any f 1d such
that f 1d (t) > 0∀t ∈ T there always exists a distribution with increased polarisation, f
2
d , such
that candidate platforms and implemented policies differ from those under f 1d .
Proof. See Appendix D
The fact that polarisation has no impact in a legislative election stems directly from
Corollary 2 to Proposition 1 - types tij and tji always vote the same way. In a single-district
election, an increase in polarisation will change the composition of swing voters, which in turn
changes the platforms candidates campaign on and the policies that are implemented. To
take an extreme example, if polarisation is so pronounced that only core party supporters
tLN , tLY , tRN , tRY exist - we get multiple equilibria. As there are no more swing voters,
choosing pro- or anti-reform policies are both best responses for each candidate. More
generally, changes in polarisation in a single-district election can lead to any of the four
policies being implemented despite no change in t˜LRmed, t˜
NY
med. As the implemented policy
in single-district elections may already have been suboptimal, an increase in polarisation
may either increase or decrease the utility of the median voter. In a legislative election,
polarisation has no effect on outcomes, so the implemented policy remains that preferred by
t˜LRD+1
2
on the left-right dimension and t˜NYD+1
2
on the reform dimension.
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6 Conclusion
It is commonly thought that in an election with two parties there can be no strategic
voting - your best option is to simply vote for your preferred candidate. This truly is the case
in single-district elections with multiple dimensions of policy and multi-district elections with
one dimension of policy. In this paper, I showed that when elections have multiple districts
and multiple policy dimensions, strategic voting comes to the fore. In contrast to a single-
district model, the intensity of a voter’s preference on each dimension is irrelevant for her
voting decision. Instead, she votes solely based on the dimension most likely to be pivotal
in the legislature. Anticipating this behaviour, candidates put forward a different set of
policies. I showed that for large elections, the implemented policy bundle: (a) is uniquely
pinned down by voter preferences, (b) is the issue-by-issue majority-preferred bundle, (c)
is a Condorcet winner if one exists. These properties are seldom guaranteed in a single-
district election or if voters are not strategic. I also showed that parliamentary systems lead
to better policies than presidential systems if they have the same median voter. Finally, I
established that increased polarisation does not affect policy in a legislative election, while
it can significantly change outcomes in a single-district election.
The model has a number of implications for what we should expect to see in real-world
elections. First, both voters and candidates in a district will behave differently depending on
whether the election is a local (mayoral/gubernatorial) election, or it is part of a legislative
election. As a result, the platforms candidates campaign under and the eventual winner
may differ between election types even if voter preferences remain constant. This implies
we should proceed with caution when interpreting changes in vote share as changes in voter
preferences. Second, the margin of victory in a district will depend on which dimension of
policy voters are focusing on. A corollary of Proposition 2 is that if a district has candi-
dates choosing opposing positions on the reform dimension, then the margin of victory for
the expected winner will be larger if voters focus on the left-right dimension rather than
the reform dimension. Taking this to the real world, we would expect the frontrunner to
campaign on the core left-right dimension while the underdog tries to woo voters on other
dimensions. Third, it is foolish for parties and candidates to ignore an opponent’s core voters
as a lost cause. Instead, they should target these voters when the left-right dimension is not
the relevant one because all voters are potential swing voters in a legislative election. A
related implication is that researchers and pollsters should not assume that core supporters
of one party never vote for the other party. This may lead to inaccurate predictions when
the relevant dimension is non-partisan. An example of this is the 2019 UK General Election
where many Labour heartlands elected pro-Brexit Conservative MPs, much to the surprise
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of political analysts. Fourth, tactical voting groups should update their strategies in light
of the fact that there is no conflict of interest between voter groups who prefer the same
policies. This should help to prevent scenarios where groups with aligned preferences but
different intensities do not cooperate. A notable example where such cooperation failed is
in the recent 2019 UK General Election where tactical voting groups wanting to stop Brexit
produced conflicting advice to groups trying to prevent a Conservative majority. A well-
meaning voter might have followed the advice on the dimension she cared more about when,
in fact, the optimal strategy was the same regardless of which dimension was more important
to her. Fifth, polls matter. But the level of information needed is not unrealistic, and the
calculations required of voters are not overwhelming. To cast their optimal ballot voters
only need to know on which dimension the legislative majority is most likely to change. If
they know this, it allows hardline left and right voters to ignore party labels and vote on
the dimension where they are more likely to make a difference. It is unlikely to occur in
real-world legislative elections unless pollster’s projections show not just the likely left-right
majority but also the majority on other key dimensions.
In the remainder of this section, I will discuss the robustness of the assumptions made
and briefly cover possible extensions. A fundamental assumption that driving the main
results of the paper is that voters are strategic rather than naive. I have already argued
that the type of strategic voting here does not require too much mental work from voters.
However, if voters in my model were instead naive, candidates and voters would all behave as
if they were in a single-district election. The positive welfare properties laid out in the paper
would no longer apply - majority-preferred policies and Condorcet winning polices would no
longer be guaranteed. Even so, the paper still sets out the best response of a strategic voter.
Regardless of whether others are strategic or naive, she should always cast her ballot based
on the dimension where the legislative majority is most likely to change. I have assumed
throughout that there are two binary dimensions of policy, arguing that there are many cases
where policy choices are binary (or perceived to be binary by voters). But what if one or
both dimensions are non-binary? This would not cause any problems in analysing individual
districts; however, we would have to include a coalition formation stage in the legislature as
any given policy on a dimension is no longer guaranteed a majority of votes.
Similarly, the focus on two dimensions of policy has been to keep things as tractable
as possible. With more than two dimensions, the task for voters would be the same - vote
based on the most likely pivotal dimension. However, as the number of dimensions increases,
the utility loss from voting naively rather than strategically grows. Why is this? The only
districts with no conflicted voters are those where both candidates choose the same policy
on every dimension they can. With two dimensions of policy, this corresponds to two of the
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four district types. 25 It can be shown that in a model with q dimensions of policy, the share
of district types with no conflicted voters is 1
2q−1
.26 This share goes to zero as the number of
policy dimensions increase, showing that the gulf between naive and strategic voting grows
as the number of dimensions increase. For candidates, including more dimensions of policy
complicates the platform choice game as there are more ways their platforms can differ. A
fully generalised version of the model is something I leave for future work.
25(aLN , aRN ) and (aLY , aRY ) districts have no conflicted voters while (aLN , aRY ) and (aLY , aRN ) districts
do
26If there are q dimensions of policy and each policy is binary, there are 2q possible policy outcomes. Each
district will have one of 22(q−1) platform pairs, and there will be 2q.q! different voter types. There are 2q−1
district types where both candidates choose the same platform on all dimensions they can and thus have no
conflicted voters. There are 22(q−1) district types where candidates choose different platforms on at least
one dimension and thus have conflicted voters.
25
Appendix A - Poisson Properties
Single-district Poisson Properties
The number of voters in a district is a Poisson random variable kd with mean k. The
probability of having exactly η voters is Pr[kd = η] =
e−kkη
η!
. Poisson Voting games exhibit
some useful properties. By environmental equivalence, from the perspective of a player in
the game, the number of other players is also a Poisson random variable kd with mean k.
By the decomposition property, the number of voters with type t ∈ T is Poisson distributed
with mean
∑
t∈T kfd(t), and is independent of the number of other types.
The probability of a vote profile xd = (xd(L), xd(R)) given voter strategies is
Pr[xd|kνd] =
e−kνd(kνd)
xd(L)
xd(L)!
e−k(1−νd)(k(1− νd))
xd(R)
xd(R)!
(7)
Its associated magnitude is
mag(xd) ≡ lim
k→∞
log(Pr[xd|kνd])
k
= lim
k→∞
νdψ
(
xd(L)
kνd
)
+ (1− νd)ψ
(
xd(R)
k(1− νd)
)
(8)
where ψ(θ) = θ(1− log(θ))− 1.
Magnitude Theorem Let an event Ad be a subset of all possible vote profiles in district
d. The magnitude theorem (Myerson (2000)) states that for a large population of size k, the
magnitude of an event, mag(Ad), is:
mag(Ad) ≡ lim
k→∞
log(Pr[Ad])
k
= lim
k→∞
max
xd∈Ad
νdψ
(
xd(L)
kνd
)
+ (1− νd)ψ
(
xd(R)
k(1− νd)
)
(9)
That is, as k →∞, the magnitude of an event Ad is simply the magnitude of the most likely
vote profile xd ∈ Ad. The magnitude mag(Ad) ∈ [−1, 0] represents the speed at which the
probability of the event goes to zero as k →∞; the more negative its magnitude, the faster
that event’s probability converges to zero.
Corollary to the Magnitude Theorem If two events Ad and A
′
d have mag(Ad) >
mag(A′d), then their probability ratio converges to zero as k →∞.
mag(A′d) < mag(Ad)⇒ lim
k→∞
Pr[A′d]
Pr[Ad]
= 0 (10)
Suppose we have a 2-candidate election with νd > 0.5, so that the left candidate has a
higher expected vote share.
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Maximising Equation 9 subject to the appropriate constraints we get
mag(Lwin) = 0 (11)
mag(Rwin) = 2
√
νd(1− νd)− 1
With a magnitude of zero, by the corollary, the probability of the left candidate winning
goes to 1 as k gets large.
Multi-District Poisson Properties
Let x ≡ (x1, . . . , xd, . . . , xD) be the realised profile of votes across districts. The proba-
bility of a particular profile of votes is
Pr[x|kν] =
∏
d∈D
e−kνd(kνd)
xd(L)
xd(L)!
e−k(1−νd)(k(1− νd))
xd(R)
xd(R)!
(12)
After some manipulation, taking the log of both sides, and taking the limit as k → ∞
we get the magnitude of this profile of votes
mag(x) ≡ lim
k→∞
log(Pr[x|kν])
k
= lim
k→∞
∑
d∈D
νdψ
(
xd(L)
kνd
)
+(1−νd)ψ
(
xd(R)
k(1− νd)
)
=
∑
d
mag(xd)
(13)
Multi-District Magnitude Theorem
Let A = (A1, . . . , Ad, . . . , AD) be a multi-district event, where each Ad is a particular
district event. Let x¯d ∈ Ad = argmax
xd
νdψ
(
xd(L)
kνd
)
+ (1 − νd)ψ
(
xd(R)
k(1−νd)
)
, that is, x¯d is the
most likely district vote profile in Ad given νd . Then, Multi-District Magnitude Theorem
Hughes (2016) states that:
mag(A) =
D∑
d=1
mag(Ad) =
D∑
d=1
mag(x¯d) = mag(x¯) (14)
The first inequality follows from the independence of districts; the second equality follows
from the magnitude theorem and the independence of districts; the third equality follows
from Equation 13. Together they show that the single-district magnitude theorem extends
to a multi-district setting.
Following from this, and using Equation 10, we have that the corollary to the magnitude
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theorem also extends to the multi-district case. If mag(A′) < mag(A), then
lim
k→∞
Pr[A′|kν]
Pr[A|kν]
= lim
k→∞
ekmag(A
′)
ekmag(A)
= lim
k→∞
ek(mag(x¯
′)−mag(x¯)) = 0 (15)
28
Appendix B - Single-District Model
In this section, I characterise the equilibria of a single-district model first developed by
Krasa and Polborn (2010). Two candidates compete in a single district. As in the legislative
model, each candidate is constrained on the left-right dimension but free to choose a pro-
or anti-reform policy. Voters vote by majority rule, and the winning candidate implements
his platform as policy. Most of the results in this section follow directly from Krasa and
Polborn (2010). However, they do not analyse the equilibrium properties as the size of the
electorate increases.27 By modelling the setup as a Poisson game and looking for asymptotic
equilibria, I can show what happens to chosen platforms and implemented policies as the
number of voters increase.
The voting stage is straightforward in a single-district election. There are three dif-
ferences between voting here and in legislative elections. First, voting can no longer be a
strategic choice because voters can only be pivotal between the two policy platforms offered
by candidates. For each platform pair a voter faces, her preferred option is pinned down by
her type, so her vote choice is deterministic. Table 3 shows the voting behaviour of each
type in each of the four scenarios.
District Vote vL Vote vR
(aLN , aRN)
tNL, tLN , tY L, tLY tNR, tRN , tY R, tRY
(aLY , aRY )
(aLN , aRY ) tNL, tLN , tNR, tLY tY L, tRN , tY R, tRY
(aLY , aRN) tY L, tLN , tY R, tLY tNL, tRN , tNR, tRY
Table 3: Best responses of each voter type
Second, from Table 3, we see that preference intensity does matter here. Types tij and
tji vote the same way in only three out of the four cases. This creates a conflict of interest
between voter groups that want the same policy implemented but disagree about which is
the second-best policy. Third, we see that tLN and tLY types always vote vL while tRN and
tRY types always vote vR. The fact that these voters are never swing voters means candidates
can safely ignore them when making their platform choices.
At the candidate competition stage, knowing how each voter type will vote, the left
candidate will choose µL to maximise the expression below, while the right candidate will
27In their model, there is no population uncertainty, so there would be no effect of increasing the size of
the electorate.
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choose µR to minimise it.
Pr[Lwin|µL, µR] = (µLµR + (1− µL)(1− µR))Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)]
+ µL(1− µR)Pr[Lwin|(aLY , aRN)] (16)
+ (1− µL)(µR)Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRY )]
Letting tˆLY ≡ tLY ∪ tY L ∪ tY R ∪ tLN and tˆLN ≡ tLN ∪ tNL ∪ tNR ∪ tLY we can state the
following proposition.
Proposition 8. For any given fd, the candidate equilibrium in a single-district election is
unique. The equilibrium strategies as k →∞ are represented in Table 4.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Case District Preferences µL µR a
∗
d
1 fd(tˆLN) > fd(tL) > fd(tˆLY ) 0 0 (aLN , aRN)
2 fd(tˆLY ) > fd(tL) > fd(tˆLN) 1 1 (aLY , aRY )
fd(tˆLN), fd(tˆLY ) > fd(tL)
3a fd(tˆLY ), fd(tˆLN) > fd(tL), 0.5 µ
∗
L → 0.5 µ
∗
R → 0.5 mixed
3b 0.5, fd(tˆLN) > fd(tˆLY ) > fd(tL) µ
∗
L → 1 µ
∗
R → 0 (aLY , aRN)
3c 0.5, fd(tˆLY ) > fd(tˆLN) > fd(tL) µ
∗
L → 0 µ
∗
R → 1 (aLN , aRY )
fd(tL) > fd(tˆLN), fd(tˆLY )
4a 0.5, fd(tL) > fd(tˆLN), fd(tˆLY ) µ
∗
L → 0.5 µ
∗
R → 0.5 mixed
4b fd(tL) > fd(tˆLN) > fd(tˆLY ), 0.5 µ
∗
L → 1 µ
∗
R → 0 (aLY , aRN)
4c fd(tL) > fd(tˆLY ) > fd(tˆLN), 0.5 µ
∗
L → 0 µ
∗
R → 1 (aLN , aRY )
Table 4: Equilibrium platforms in the single-district candidate competition game as k →∞.
Examining Table 4, a number of differences stand out from the legislative model in
Table 2.
First, there are more cases to consider in a single-district election. This is because in a
legislative election the relative size of fd(tL) and fd(tN) pins down the candidate equilibrium,
while in a single-district election the relative sizes of fd(tL), fd(tˆLN) and fd(tˆLY ) all matter.
This difference stems from the fact that in a single-district election only a subset of voters
are swing voters, while in a legislative election all voters are.
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Second, we see that the mapping from district preferences into policy pairs differs between
the two tables. That is, the same district preferences may lead to one candidate equilibrium
in a single-district election and a different one in a legislative election.
Third, even as k →∞ we can have equilibria in mixed strategies which are not degenerate
in a single-district election. For the district preferences in case 3a and 4a the realisation
of platforms and the eventual winning policy is random. Furthermore, the advantaged
candidate does not win with probability → 1. This contrasts with the legislative election
case where as k →∞ voter preferences pin down policy and the advantaged candidate wins
with probability → 1.
Finally, from Table 4 we can see that a Condorcet winner (if it exists) may not win a
single-district election. This can happen in two different ways. First, it may be that there is
a Condorcet winner but preferences correspond to case 3a or 4a so that candidates randomise
equally over platforms. Here, with probability 0.5, the Condorcet winner policy will not be
on the ballot. Second, in cases 1 and 2, a Condorcet Winner policy may exist but not be
chosen by a candidate. For example, this occurs in case 1 if fd(tY ) > fd(tN) so that aLY or
aRY is a Condorcet winner, but the equilibrium platforms are be (aLN , aRN).
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Appendix C - Double-Pivotal Events
In a legislature with D districts where each district could potentially have one of 4
candidates {LN,LY,RN,RY } elected there are (D+1)(D+2)(D+3)
6
possible seat distributions
S.28 From the point of view of a voter in district d - she needs to consider the expected seat
distribution in the other D− 1 districts when casting her vote. Call this E(S−d). There are
(D)(D+1)(D+2)
6
possible seat distributions E(S−d). Of these,
D+1
2
will be double-pivotal events.
Those are cases where both sLN = sRY and sLN = sRY .
There are
∑D−1
2
n=1 4n seat distributions which are single-pivotal events, that is where sLN+
sLY = sRN + sRY or sLN + sRN = sLY + sRY . There are the same number of events where
either sLN = sRY or sLN = sRY holds but both do not hold simultaneously, I call these
diagonal seat distributions. This set of expected seat distributions is important, as only
with a diagonal seat distribution is it possible for a district to condition on the double-
pivotal event. Combining all of the above, we can express a lower bound on the share of seat
distributions in which no district conditions on a double-pivotal event as
1−
(D + 1) +
∑D−1
2
n=1 24n
(D)(D + 1)(D + 2)
(17)
For D = 101 it is ≈ 0.971 , for the US House of Representatives with D = 435 it is ≈ 0.993
and for the UK House of Commons withD = 649 it is ≈ 0.9954. Thus, in the vast majority of
possible seat distributions, it is not possible for any district to condition on a double-pivotal
event.
We can go one step further and examine diagonal seat distributions - those seat dis-
tributions which in theory could allow a district to condition on a double-pivotal event.
Suppose a district d has a diagonal seat distribution E(S−d). When can it condition on a
double-pivotal event? If district d faces (aLY , aRY ) or (aLN , aRN) it cannot condition on a
double-pivotal event as it can only ever be pivotal on the left-right dimension. For district
d to be conditioning on a double-pivotal event it must be that it faces either (aLY , aRN) or
(aLN , aRY ) and its most likely pivotal event is pivd(LR,NY ).
We can thus ask - conditional on E(S−d) being a diagonal seat distribution, what is the
probability that the most likely pivotal event for district d is pivd(LR,NY )? To do this,
we look at every diagonal event and calculate the share of double-pivotal events out of all
pivotal events for district d given that distribution E(S−d). I make two assumptions in order
to be able to do so. First, I assume that for any expected seat distribution E(S−d), the
expected runner-up in each district is equally likely to be pro- or anti-reform. For example,
28This is the (D + 1)th tetrahedral or triangular pyramidal number.
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if we have D = 11 and E(S−d) = (sLN , sLY , sRN , sRY ) = (0, 0, 0, 10) it could be that all ten
of those sRY seats come from (aLN , aRY ) districts. Or it could be that nine of them come
from (aLN , aRY ) districts and one comes from a (aLY , aRY ) district, or it could be that eight
come from (aLN , aRY ) districts and two comes from (aLY , aRY ) districts, and so on. There is
only one way the first event can happen, 9 ways the second event can happen and 36 ways
the third event can happen. Each subsequent term is the next column in Pascal’s triangle
for D − 2.
For any seat distribution E(Sd) we can rank the districts in terms of safeness - where
the safer the seat, the higher the probability of the expected winner winning. The second
assumption I make is that each district is equally likely to be in every position in the safeness
ranking. Returning to the example of E(Sd) = (sLN , sLY , sRN , sRY ) = (0, 0, 0, 10), this
means that the probability of a district being in the one of the 5 “safest” districts is 5
10
.
The probability of two particular districts being in the top 5 safest districts is 5
10
× 4
9
and
so on. Given these two assumptions, the share of cases where a district d facing a diagonal
distribution E(S−d) conditions on a double-pivotal event is given by
∑D−3
2
k=0 2
k
[
1 +
∑D−3
2
−k
i=1
∑i
x=0
(
i
x
)
(D−1−2i−k)!
(D−1
2
−i)!
(D−1
2
+x)!
(D−1−i−k+x)!
]
(D+1
2
2
)
(2
D−1
2 )
For a legislature of D = 101 the share is ≈ 0.0045, for the US House of Representatives
with D = 435 it is ≈ 0.0015 for the UK House of Commons with D = 649 it is ≈ 0.0007.
Note that this is the share of diagonal seat distributions where a district is conditioning on
a double-pivotal event, not the share of all seat distributions. As we saw above, the share
of distributions that are diagonal are themselves tiny.
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Appendix D - Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Step 1: Unconflicted voters have a dominant strategy for any a.
In (aLN , aRN) and (aLY , aRY ) districts the relevant gain function is Equation 3. This gain
function will always be positive for tL and negative for tR types regardless of the values of
the pivot probabilities. In (aLY , aRN) districts the relevant gain function is Equation 4. This
gain function will always be positive for tLY and tY L types but negative for tRN and tNR
types regardless of the values of the pivot probabilities. In (aLN , aRY ) districts the relevant
gain function is Equation 5. This gain function will always be positive for tLN and tNL types
but negative for tRY and tY R types regardless of the values of the pivot probabilities.
Step 2: The best response of a conflicted voter depends on the strategies of voters in the
other D − 1 districts.
In (aLY , aRN) districts every pivot probability is positive if all other D − 1 districts are
not (aLY , aRN) districts, which is guaranteed by Assumption 1. As types tLN , tNL, tRY , tY R
have both positive and negative terms in their gain functions, their best response will depend
on the values of the various pivot probabilities. These pivotal probabilities depend on the
strategies of voters in the other D − 1 districts; therefore, the best response of conflicted
voters in d depends on the strategies of voters in the other D − 1 districts. By the same
argument, the best response of types tLY , tY L, tRN , tNR in (aLN , aRY ) districts depends on
the strategies of voters in the other D − 1 districts.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Take a (aLY , aRN) district and suppose there is a pivotal event which has a larger
magnitude than all others. Without loss of generality let this be pivd(LR|Y ). We can then
divide both sides of the relevant gain function Equation 4 by the probability of this pivotal
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event to get
Gt,d(vL|(aLY , aRN), kν, a−d)
Pr[pivd(LR|Y )]
= (U(zLY |t)− U(zRY |t) (18)
+
Pr[pivd(LR|N)]
Pr[pivd(LR|Y )]
(U(zLN |t)− U(zRN |t))
+
Pr[pivd(NY |L))]
Pr[pivd(LR|Y )]
(U(zLY |t)− U(zLN |t))
+
Pr[pivd(NY |R)]
Pr[pivd(LR|Y )]
(U(zRY |t)− U(zRN |t))
+
Pr[pivd(LR,NY )]
Pr[pivd(LR|Y )]
(U(zLY |t)− U(zRN |t))
Taking limits and applying the corollary to the magnitude theorem we get
lim
k→∞
Gt,d(vL|(aLY , aRN), kν, a−d)
Pr[pivd(LR|Y )]
= U(zLY |t)− U(zRY |t) (19)
Therefore, if there is a unique pivotal event with largest magnitude, voters in d should base
their decision only on this event.
It remains to show that there is always a unique pivotal event with largest magnitude.
To see this, notice that the magnitude of a pivotal event is determined by the expected vote
share of the left candidate across districts ν. Recall that a strictly perfect equilibrium must
be robust to epsilon changes in the strategies of players. Therefore, in any strictly perfect
equilibrium, the pivotal event with largest magnitude must be unique.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. If voters condition on piv(LR), the positions of candidates on the reform dimension
is irrelevant for voters - any choice of µ is a best response. If voters condition on piv(NY ),
the expected probability of winning for the left candidate is given by Equation 6
The left candidate will choose µL to maximise Equation 6, while the right candidate will
choose µR to minimise it. This yields the following best response correspondences:
BRL(µR) =


1 if µR > µ˜R
[0, 1] if µR = µ˜R
0 if µR < µ˜R
(20)
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BRR(µL) =


1 if µL < µ˜L
[0, 1] if µL = µ˜L
0 if µL > µ˜L
(21)
where µ˜L and µ˜R are given by:
µ˜L ≡
Pr[Lwin|(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )] + Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)]− 1
2Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)]− 1
µ˜R ≡ 1− µ˜L
We can divide districts into 8 possible preference cases, We analyse each in turn:
• Case 1: If fd(tN) > fd(tL), 1 − fd(tL), then µL = µR = 0. I prove this for the
case of fd(tN) > fd(tL) > 0.5, as the other case is identical. fd(tN) > fd(tL) > 0.5
and voter strategies given in Table 1 imply that Pr[Lwin|(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )] >
Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN) > 0.5. This in turn means that µ˜L < 0 and µ˜R > 1 and that both
are playing a best response at (µL, µR) = (0, 0)
• Cases 2: If fd(tY ) > fd(tL), 1 − fd(tL), then µL = µR = 1. I prove this for the
case of fd(tY ) > fd(tL) > 0.5, as the other case is identical. fd(tY ) > fd(tL) > 0.5
and voter strategies given in Table 1 imply that 1−Pr[Lwin|(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )] >
Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN) > 0.5. This in turn means that µ˜L > 1 and µ˜R < 0 and that both
are playing a best response at (µL, µR) = (1, 1)
• Case 3a & 3b: If fd(tL) > fd(tN) > 0.5 or fd(tR) > fd(tY ) > 0.5, then
(µL, µR) = (µ˜L, µ˜R). I prove this for the case of fd(tL) > fd(tN) > 0.5, as the other
is identical. fd(tL) > fd(tN) > 0.5 and voter strategies given in Table 1 imply that
Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN) > 1− Pr[Lwin|(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )] > 0.5. This in turn means
that µ˜L ∈ (0, 0.5) and µ˜R ∈ (0.5, 1) and that both are playing a best response at
(µL, µR) = (µ˜L, µ˜R).
• Cases 4a & 4b: If fd(tL) > fd(tY ) > 0.5 or fd(tR) > fd(tN) > 0.5, then
(µL, µR) = (µ˜L, µ˜R). I prove this for the case of fd(tL) > fd(tY ) > 0.5, as the other
is identical. fd(tL) > fd(tY ) > 0.5 and voter strategies given in Table 1 imply that
Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN) > Pr[Lwin|(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )] > 0.5. This in turn means
that µ˜L ∈ (0.5, 1) and µ˜R ∈ (0, 0.5) and that both are playing a best response at
(µL, µR) = (µ˜L, µ˜R).
36
Next, I show that in cases 3a,3b,4a,4b the mixed strategy probabilities converge to de-
generate probabilities as k →∞.
Let νd[(aLN , aRN)] represent the expected vote share of the left candidate if voters vote on
the left-right dimension and let νd[(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )] represent the expected vote share
of the left candidate if he is anti-reform while the right candidate is pro-reform and voters
vote on the reform dimension. νd[(aLN , aRR), piv
1(NY )] = 1 − νd[(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )] is
similarly defined.
From Appendix A we know that if νd[(aLN , aRN)] > 0.5
then mag[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)] = 0 and mag[Rwin|(aLN , aRN)] =
2
√
νd[(aLN , aRN)](1− νd[(aLN , aRN)]) − 1. Similarly if νd[(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )] > 0.5
then mag[Lwin|(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )] = 0 and mag[Rwin|(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )] =
2
√
νd[(aLY , aRN), piv1(NY )](1− νd[(aLY , aRN), piv1(NY )])− 1.
Furthermore, if νd[(aLN , aRN)] > νd[(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )] > 0.5 then we have
mag[Rwin|(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )] > mag[Rwin|(aLN , aRN)]. From the corollary to the mag-
nitude theorem we know that if mag[Rwin|(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )] > mag[Rwin|(aLN , aRN)]
then limk→∞
Pr[Rwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
Pr[Rwin|(aLY ,aRN ),piv1(NY )]
= 0. We can now examine that happens to (µ˜L, µ˜R) as
k →∞ in cases 5-8.
• Case 3a: If fd(tL) > fd(tN) > 0.5. Voter preferences and voter strategies
given in Table 1 imply νd[(aLN , aRN)] > 1 − νd[(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )] > 0.5. This
implies mag[Rwin|(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )] = mag[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)] = 0 and 0 >
mag[Lwin|(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )] > mag[Rwin|(aLN , aRN)] > −1.
We can re-write
µ˜L ≡
1− Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)]− Pr[Lwin|(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )]
1− Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)]− Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)]
and we can divide top and bottom by Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)] to get
µ˜L ≡
1−Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
− Pr[Lwin|(aLY ,aRN ),piv
1(NY )]
Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
1−Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
− 1
As in each case the denominator has a larger magnitude than the numerator, each
probability ratio goes to zero as k →∞ and we get
lim
k→∞
(µ˜L, µ˜R) = (0, 1)
• Case 3b: If fd(tR) > fd(tY ) > 0.5, voter preferences and voter strategies given
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in Table 1 imply 1 − νd[(aLN , aRN)] > νd[(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )] > 0.5. This
implies mag[Lwin|(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )] = mag[Rwin|(aLN , aRN)] = 0 and 0 >
mag[Rwin|(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )] > mag[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)] > −1.
We can re-write
µ˜L ≡
1− Pr[Lwin|(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )]− Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)]
1− Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)]− Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)]
and we can divide top and bottom by 1− Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)] to get
µ˜L ≡
1−Pr[Lwin|(aLY ,aRN ),piv
1(NY )]
1−Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
− Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
1−Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
1− Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
1−Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
As in each case the denominator has a larger magnitude than the numerator, each
probability ratio goes to zero as k →∞ and we get
lim
k→∞
(µ˜L, µ˜R) = (0, 1)
• Case 4a: If fd(tL) > fd(tY ) > 0.5, voter preferences and voter strategies
given in Table 1 imply νd[(aLN , aRN)] > νd[(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )] > 0.5. This
implies mag[Lwin|(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )] = mag[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)] = 0 and 0 >
mag[Rwin|(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )] > mag[Rwin|(aLN , aRN)] > −1.
We can re-write
µ˜L ≡
1− Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)]− Pr[Lwin|(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )]
1− Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)]− Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)]
and we can divide top and bottom by Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)] to get
µ˜L ≡
1−Pr[Lwin|(aLY ,aRN ),piv
1(NY )]
Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
− 1
1−Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
− 1
As in each case the denominator has a larger magnitude than the numerator, each
probability ratio goes to zero as k →∞ and we get
lim
k→∞
(µ˜L, µ˜R) = (1, 0)
• Case 4b: If fd(tR) > fd(tN) > 0.5, voter preferneces and voter strategies given
in Table 1 imply 1 − νd[(aLN , aRN)] > 1 − νd[(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )] > 0.5. This
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implies mag[Rwin|(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )] = mag[Rwin|(aLN , aRN)] = 0 and 0 >
mag[Lwin|(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )] > mag[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)] > −1.
We can re-write
µ˜L ≡
1− Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)]− Pr[Lwin|(aLY , aRN), piv
1(NY )]
1− Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)]− Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)]
and we can divide top and bottom by 1− Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)] to get
µ˜L ≡
1− Pr[Lwin|(aLY ,aRN ),piv
1(NY )]
1−Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
1− Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
1−Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
As in each case the denominator has a larger magnitude than the numerator, each
probability ratio goes to zero as k →∞ and we get
lim
k→∞
(µ˜L, µ˜R) = (1, 0)
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. I prove this proposition by showing the probability of the dis-advantaged candidate
being the expected winner goes to zero as k → ∞. Let fd(tL), fd(tN) > 0.5 so that the left
candidate is advantaged and the majority of voters oppose the reform. The right candidate
is the expected winner only if the platforms are (aLY , aRN) and we have piv
1(NY ). The
realised platforms are (aLY , aRN) with probability µL(1 − µR). However, from Table 2 we
see that when fd(tL), fd(tN) > 0.5 we have µL → 0 and µR → 1. Therefore, as k → ∞,
the probability of the right candidate being the expected winner, even conditional on the
district having piv1(NY ), goes to zero.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. First, I show that E(z) is unique and pinned down by f . From Proposition 2 we know
that: (i) within the set of responsive equilibria, a is pinned down by f ; and (ii) as k →∞ all
mixing probabilities go to 0 or 1. Therefore, the realisation of platforms is completely pinned
down by f and voter behaviour is described by Table 1. There may be multiple equilibria in
the voting game, but from Proposition 3 we know that in each equilibrium the advantaged
candidate chooses the majority-preferred reform policy and wins the seat with probability
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going to one. The legislative voting rule means that each elected candidate votes for the
policies they campaigned under. Thus, there is a direct mapping from f to the expected
policy E(z).
Next, I show that E(z) must be preferred by t˜LRn+1
2
on the left-right dimension and by
t˜NYn+1
2
on the reform dimension. Without loss of generality let zLN be the expected policy. It
must then be that E(sLN) + E(sLY ) >
D+1
2
and E(sLN) + E(sRN) >
D+1
2
. We know from
Proposition 3 that the expected winner has the policy preferred by a majority of voters in d
on each dimension. Therefore is must be that t˜LRn+1
2
∈ {tL} and t˜
LR
n+1
2
∈ {tN}.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. In a given district, zLN is a Condorcet winner if fd(tL), fd(tN), fd(tˆLY ) > 0.5 holds.
In a given district, zLN is a Condorcet winner if fd(tL) > 0.5, fd(tN) > 0.5, and fd(tLY ∪
tLN ∪ tNL ∪ tNR) > 0.5 all hold. We know from Proposition 3 that if fd(tL), fd(tN) > 0.5,
the expected winner is the left candidate with platform aLN , and he wins with probability
going to 1 as k →∞. Therefore, if zLN is a Condorcet winner in district d, a candidate with
platform aLN will win the seat with probability going to 1.
Now, suppose zLN is a Legislative Condorcet winner. It must therefore be that (i)
fd(tL) > 0.5 in at least
D+1
2
districts, (ii) fd(tN) > 0.5 in at least
D+1
2
districts, and (iii)
fd(tˆLY ) > 0.5 in at least
D+1
2
districts. From Proposition 3 we know that in the districts
where (i) holds the left candidate is the expected winner and in districts where (ii) holds
the expected winner has an anti-reform platform. Therefore there must be a majority of
districts where the left candidate is the expected winner, and a majority of districts where
an anti-reform candidate is the expected winner. Given how seats map into policy in the
legislature, it must therefore be that the expected implemented policy E(z) = zLN .
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. By adding t˜jmed = t˜
j
D+1
2
∀j ∈ {LR,NY } to Proposition 4, we know that the unique
expected policy E(z) in parliamentary system is that which is preferred by t˜jmed on dimension
j ∈ {LR,NY }. All that remains to show is that utility of t˜jmed is weakly lower under a
presidential system.
To prove that the utility of t˜jmed∀j ∈ {LR,NY } is weakly lower under a presidential
system, I show for each case in Table 4 that the implemented policy z on dimension j need
not coincide with that preferred by t˜jmed.
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• Case 1: Here we will have z = aLN if t˜
LR
med = tL and z = aRN otherwise. However,
given fd(tˆLN) > fd(tL) > fd(tˆLY ), it is possible that t˜
NY
med = tY in which case z does not
coincide with the preferred option of the median on each dimension.
• Case 2: Here we will have z = aLY if t˜
LR
med = tL and z = aRY otherwise. However,
given fd(tˆLY ) > fd(tL) > fd(tˆLN), it is possible that t˜
NY
med = tN in which case z does
not coincide with the preferred option of the median on each dimension.
• Case 3a:There are two sub-cases to consider here. First, suppose t˜LRmed = tL - then, with
probability 0.5 we will have z = aLN and with probability 0.5 we will have z = aLY .
In each case, with probability 0.5 z does not coincide with the preferred option of the
median on each dimension. Second, suppose t˜LRmed = tR - each of the four policies will
be implemented with probability 0.25. Therefore, with probability 0.75, z does not
coincide with the preferred option of the median on each dimension.
• Case 3b: Here we will have z = aRN . Given 0.5, fd(tˆLN) > fd(tˆLY ) > fd(tL) we must
have t˜LRmed = tR but we can have t˜
NY
med = tY in which case z does not coincide with the
preferred option of the median on each dimension.
• Case 3c: Here we will have z = aRY . Given 0.5, fd(tˆLY ) > fd(tˆLN) > fd(tL) we must
have t˜LRmed = tR but we can have t˜
NY
med = tN in which case z does not coincide with the
preferred option of the median on each dimension.
• Case 4a:There are two sub-cases to consider here. First, suppose t˜LRmed = tR - then, with
probability 0.5 we will have z = aRN and with probability 0.5 we will have z = aRY .
In each case, with probability 0.5 z does not coincide with the preferred option of the
median on each dimension. Second, suppose t˜LRmed = tL - each of the four policies will
be implemented with probability 0.25. Therefore, with probability 0.75, z does not
coincide with the preferred option of the median on each dimension.
• Case 4b: Here we will have z = aLY . Given fd(tL) > fd(tˆLN) > fd(tˆLY ), 0.5 we must
have t˜LRmed = tL but we can have t˜
NY
med = tN in which case z does not coincide with the
preferred option of the median on each dimension.
• Case 4c: Here we will have z = aLN . Given fd(tL) > fd(tˆLY ) > fd(tˆLN), 0.5 we must
have t˜LRmed = tL but we can have t˜
NY
med = tY in which case z does not coincide with the
preferred option of the median on each dimension.
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Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. The fact the polarisation will have no effect on voter behaviour, candidate platforms or
implemented policies in legislative elections follows directly from Corollary 2 to Proposition
1.
To show the result for single-district elections, take a f 1d such that f
1
d (t) > 0∀t ∈ T and
suppose without loss of generality that fd(tL), fd(tN) > 0.5 so that t˜
LR
med = tL and t˜
NY
med = tN .
Without any further restriction on fd the equilibrium may be any one of 6 equilibrium cases
laid out in Table 4 : {1,2,3a,4a,4b,4c}. Which case is in fact the equilibrium depends on
the relative sizes of fd(tˆLN), fd(tL) and fd(tˆLY ). For the new distribution f
2
d we must have
f 2d (tL) = f
1
d (tL) = fd(tL) > 0.5 as polarisation does not affect the total share of tL voters. I
will proceed by showing that whichever of the 6 equilibria occurs under f 1, a more polarised
distribution f 2 can change the equilibrium to one of the other equilibria.
• From Case 1 to Case 4a/4b/4c: Suppose that under f 1d we had fd(tˆLN) > fd(tL) >
fd(tˆLY ). This corresponds to Case 1 in Table 4 where the equilibrium platforms are
(aLN , aRN) and the expected policy is E(z) = aLN
Now, take a distribution such that polarisation increases - specifically such that
f 1d (tˆLN) > fd(tL) > f
2
d (tˆLN) (This would be the case if e.g. f
2
d (tRN) = f
1
d (tRN)+f
1
d (tNR)
and f 2d (tY L) = f
1
d (tY L)). The increase in polarisation from f
1 to f 2 gives a re-ordering
of the size of voter groups such that now fd(tL) > fd(tˆLN), fd(tˆLN). This corresponds to
either Case 4a if fd(tˆLN), fd(tˆLY ) < 0.5, Case 4b if fd(tˆLN) > fd(tˆLY ), 0.5 and Case 4c if
fd(tˆLY ) > fd(tˆLN), 0.5 . In case 4a each candidate mixes with equal probability and the
implemented policy is any of the four policies with equal probability. In Case 4b the
equilibrium platforms are (aLY , aRN) and the expected policy is E(z) = aLY . In Case
4c the equilibrium platforms are (aLN , aRY ) and the expected policy is E(z) = aLN .
• From Case 4a/4b/4c to Case 2: Take a distribution such that polarisation increases
- specifically such that f 2d (tˆLY ) > fd(tL) > f
1
d (tˆLY ) (This would be the case if e.g.
f 2d (tLN) = f
1
d (tLN) + f
1
d (tNL) and f
2
d (tY R) = f
1
d (tY R)). The increase in polarisation
from f 1 to f 2 gives a re-ordering of the size of voter groups such that now fd(tˆLN) >
fd(tL) > fd(tˆLN). This corresponds to either Case 2 in Table 4. The equilibrium
platforms are then (aLY , aRY ) and the expected policy is E(z) = aLY .
• From Case 2 to Case 3a: Take a distribution such that polarisation increases -
specifically such that f 2d (tˆLN) > fd(tL) > f
1
d (tˆLN) (This would be the case if e.g.
f 2d (tLY ) = f
1
d (tLY )+f
1
d (tY L) and f
2
d (tNR) = f
1
d (tNR)). The increase in polarisation from
f 1 to f 2 gives a re-ordering of the size of voter groups such that now fd(tˆLY ), fd(tˆLN) >
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fd(tL). This corresponds to either Case 3a in Table 4. Each candidate mixes with equal
probability and the implemented policy is zLN or zLY with equal probability.
• From Case 3a to Case 1: Take a distribution such that polarisation increases -
specifically such that f 1d (tˆLY ) > fd(tL) > f
2
d (tˆLY ) (This would be the case if e.g.
f 2d (tRY ) = f
1
d (tRY ) + f
1
d (tY R) and f
2
d (tNL) = f
1
d (tNL)). The increase in polarisation
from f 1 to f 2 gives a re-ordering of the size of voter groups such that now fd(tˆLN) >
fd(tL) > fd(tˆLY ). This corresponds to either Case 1 in Table 4. The equilibrium
platforms are then (aLN , aRN) and the expected policy is E(z) = aLN .
The above cycle of increases in polarisation shows that regardless of which equilibrium
we being with given f 1d , an increase in polarisation can move us to any of the other five
feasible equilibria. The proof for the case of fd(tL), fd(tN) > 0.5 is identical, while in the
case of fd(tR) > 0.5 the relevant equilibria are {1,2,3a,3b,3c,4a}. Using the same approach
as above, one can show that an increase in polarisation can move a single-district election
from any one equilibrium to any other.
Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. The left candidate will choose µL to maximise the expression, while the right candi-
date will choose µR to minimise it. This yields the following best response correspondences:
BRL(µR) =


1 if µR > µ˜R
[0, 1] if µR = µ˜R
0 if µR < µ˜R
(22)
BRR(µL) =


1 if µL < µ˜L
[0, 1] if µL = µ˜L
0 if µL > µ˜L
(23)
where µ˜L and µ˜R are given by:
µ˜L ≡
Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)]− Pr[Lwin|(aLY , aRN)]
2Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)]− Pr[Lwin|(aLY , aRN)]− Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRR)]
(24)
µ˜R ≡ 1− µ˜L
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We can also write Equation 24 as
µ˜L ≡
Pr[Rwin|(aLN , aRN)]− Pr[Rwin|(aLY , aRN)]
2Pr[Rwin|(aLN , aRN)]− Pr[Rwin|(aLY , aRN)]− Pr[Rwin|(aLN , aRR)]
(25)
We can divide districts into 8 possible preference cases, We analyse each in turn:
• Case 1: If fd(tˆLN) > fd(tL) > fd(tˆLY ), then µL = µR = 0. fd(tˆLN) > fd(tL) >
fd(tˆLY ) and voter strategies given in Table 3 imply that Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRY )] >
Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN) > Pr[Lwin|(aLY , aRN). This in turn means that µ˜L < 0 and
µ˜R > 1 and that both are playing a best response at (µL, µR) = (0, 0).
• Case 2: If fd(tˆLY ) > fd(tL) > fd(tˆLN), then µL = µR = 1. fd(tˆLY ) > fd(tL) >
fd(tˆLN) and voter strategies given in Table 3 imply that Pr[Lwin|(aLY , aRN)] >
Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN) > Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRY ). This in turn means that µ˜L > 1 and
µ˜R < 0 and that both are playing a best response at (µL, µR) = (1, 1).
• Case 3: If fd(tˆLY ), fd(tˆLN) > fd(tL), then (µL, µR) = (µ˜L, µ˜R). There are 3 sub-cases
to consider here:
– Case 3a: With fd(tˆLY ), fd(tˆLN) > fd(tL), 0.5 and voter strategies given
in Table 3 it must be that Pr[Lwin|(aLY , aRN)], P r[Lwin|(aLN , aRY )] >
Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)], 0.5. This in turn means that µ˜L ∈ (0, 1) and µ˜R ∈ (0, 1)
and that both are playing a best response at (µL, µR) = (µ˜L, µ˜R).
– Case 3b: With 0.5, fd(tˆLN) > fd(tˆLY ) > fd(tL) and voter strategies given
in Table 3 it must be that Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRY )], 0.5 > Pr[Lwin|(aLY , aRN)] >
Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)]. This in turn means that µ˜L ∈ (0, 0.5) and µ˜R ∈ (0.5, 1)
and that both are playing a best response at (µL, µR) = (µ˜L, µ˜R).
– Case 3c: With 0.5, fd(tˆLY ) > fd(tˆLN) > fd(tL) and voter strategies given
in Table 3 it must be that Pr[Lwin|(aLY , aRN)], 0.5 > Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRY )] >
Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)]. This in turn means that µ˜L ∈ (0.5, 1) and µ˜R ∈ (0, 0.5)
and that both are playing a best response at (µL, µR) = (µ˜L, µ˜R).
• Case 4: If fd(tL) > fd(tˆLY ), fd(tˆLN), then (µL, µR) = (µ˜L, µ˜R). There are 3 sub-cases
to consider here:
– Case 4a: With 0.5, fd(tL) > fd(tˆLY ), fd(tˆLN) and voter strate-
gies given in Table 3 it must be that Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)], 0.5 >
Pr[Lwin|(aLY , aRN)], P r[Lwin|(aLN , aRY )]. This in turn means that µ˜L ∈ (0, 1)
and µ˜R ∈ (0, 1) and that both are playing a best response at (µL, µR) = (µ˜L, µ˜R).
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– Case 4b: With fd(tL) > fd(tˆLN) > fd(tˆLY ), 0.5 and voter strategies given
in Table 3 it must be that Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)] > Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRY )] >
Pr[Lwin|(aLY , aRN)], 0.5.
This in turn means that µ˜L ∈ (0.5, 1) and µ˜R ∈ (0, 0.5) and that both are playing
a best response at (µL, µR) = (µ˜L, µ˜R).
– Case 4c: With fd(tL) > fd(tˆLY ) > fd(tˆLN), 0.5 and voter strategies given
in Table 3 it must be that Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)] > Pr[Lwin|(aLY , aRN)] >
Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRY )], 0.5. This in turn means that µ˜L ∈ (0, 0.5) and µ˜R ∈ (0.5, 1)
and that both are playing a best response at (µL, µR) = (µ˜L, µ˜R).
We can now examine that happens to (µ˜L, µ˜R) as k →∞ in cases 3 and 4.
• Case 3a: With fd(tˆLY ), fd(tˆLN) > fd(tL), 0.5 and voter strategies given in Table 3
it must be that νd[(aLY , aRN)], νd[(aLN , aRY )] > νd[(aLN , aRN)], 0.5. This implies
mag[Lwin|(aLY , aRN)] = mag[Lwin|(aLN , aRY )] = 0 and mag[Rwin|(aLN , aRN)] >
mag[Rwin|(aLN , aRY )],mag[Rwin|(aLY , aRN)] > −1.
We can divide the top and bottom of Equation 25 by Pr[Rwin|(aLN , aRN)] to get
µ˜L ≡
1− Pr[Rwin|(aLY ,aRN )]
Pr[Rwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
2− Pr[Rwin|(aLY ,aRN )]
Pr[Rwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
− Pr[Rwin|(aLN ,aRY )]
Pr[Rwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
As in each case the denominator has a larger magnitude than the numerator, each
probability ratio goes to zero as k →∞ and we get
lim
k→∞
(µ˜L, µ˜R) = (0.5, 0.5)
• Case 3b: With 0.5, fd(tL) > fd(tˆLN) > fd(tˆLY ) and voter strategies given in Table 3
it must be that 0.5, νd[(aLN , aRY )] > νd[(aLY , aRN)] > νd[(aLN , aRN)]. This implies
mag[Lwin|(aLN , aRY )] > mag[Lwin|(aLY , aRN)] > mag[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)].
We can divide the top and bottom of Equation 24 by Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRY )] to get
µ˜L ≡
Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRY )]
− Pr[Lwin|(aLY ,aRN )]
Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRY )]
2Pr[Rwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRY )]
− Pr[Lwin|(aLY ,aRN )]
Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRY )]
− 1
As in each case the denominator has a larger magnitude than the numerator, each
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probability ratio goes to zero as k →∞ and we get
lim
k→∞
(µ˜L, µ˜R) = (0, 1)
• Case 3c: With 0.5, fd(tL) > fd(tˆLY ) > fd(tˆLN) and voter strategies given in Table 3
it must be that 0.5, νd[(aLY , aRN)] > νd[(aLN , aRY )] > νd[(aLN , aRN)]. This implies
mag[Lwin|(aLY , aRN)] > mag[Lwin|(aLN , aRY )] > mag[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)].
We can divide the top and bottom of Equation 24 by Pr[Lwin|(aLY , aRN)] to get
µ˜L ≡
Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
Pr[Lwin|(aLY ,aRN )]
− 1
2Pr[Rwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
Pr[Lwin|(aLY ,aRN )]
− 1− Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRY )]
Pr[Lwin|(aLY ,aRN )]
As in each case the denominator has a larger magnitude than the numerator, each
probability ratio goes to zero as k →∞ and we get
lim
k→∞
(µ˜L, µ˜R) = (1, 0)
• Case 4a: With 0.5, fd(tL) > fd(tˆLY ), fd(tˆLN) and voter strategies given in Table 3
it must be that 0.5, νd[(aLN , aRN)] > νd[(aLY , aRN)], νd[(aLN , aRY )]. This implies
mag[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)] > mag[Lwin|(aLN , aRY )],mag[Lwin|(aLY , aRN)] > −1.
We can divide the top and bottom of Equation 24 by Pr[Lwin|(aLN , aRN)] to get
µ˜L ≡
1− Pr[Lwin|(aLY ,aRN )]
Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
2− Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRY )]
Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
− Pr[Lwin|(aLY ,aRN )]
Pr[Lwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
As in each case the denominator has a larger magnitude than the numerator, each
probability ratio goes to zero as k →∞ and we get
lim
k→∞
(µ˜L, µ˜R) = (0.5, 0.5)
• Case 4b: With fd(tL) > fd(tˆLN) > fd(tˆLY ), 0.5 and voter strategies given in Table 3
it must be that νd[(aLN , aRN)] > νd[(aLN , aRY )] > νd[(aLY , aRN)], 0.5. This implies
mag[R-win|(aLY , aRN)] > mag[Rwin|(aLN , aRY )] > mag[Rwin|(aLN , aRN)] > −1.
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We can divide the top and bottom of Equation 25 by Pr[Rwin|(aLY , aRN)] to get
µ˜L ≡
Pr[Rwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
Pr[Rwin|(aLY ,aRN )]
− 1
2Pr[Rwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
Pr[Rwin|(aLY ,aRN )]
− 1− Pr[Rwin|(aLN ,aRY )]
Pr[Rwin|(aLY ,aRN )]
As in each case the denominator has a larger magnitude than the numerator, each
probability ratio goes to zero as k →∞ and we get
lim
k→∞
(µ˜L, µ˜R) = (1, 0)
• Case 4c: With fd(tL) > fd(tˆLY ) > fd(tˆLN), 0.5 and voter strategies given in Table 3
it must be that νd[(aLN , aRN)] > νd[(aLY , aRN)] > νd[(aLN , aRY )], 0.5. This implies
mag[R-win|(aLN , aRY )] > mag[Rwin|(aLY , aRN)] > mag[Rwin|(aLN , aRN)] > −1.
We can divide the top and bottom of Equation 25 by Pr[Rwin|(aLN , aRY )] to get
µ˜L ≡
Pr[Rwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
Pr[Rwin|(aLN ,aRY )]
− Pr[Rwin|(aLY ,aRN )]
Pr[Rwin|(aLN ,aRY )]
2Pr[Rwin|(aLN ,aRN )]
Pr[Rwin|(aLN ,aRY )]
− Pr[Rwin|(aLY ,aRN )]
Pr[Rwin|(aLN ,aRY )]
− 1
As in each case the denominator has a larger magnitude than the numerator, each
probability ratio goes to zero as k →∞ and we get
lim
k→∞
(µ˜L, µ˜R) = (0, 1)
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